Organized Criminal Networks and Drug Trafficking in Sri Lanka: Policy Implications and Ground Reality

Introduction

Sri Lanka’s role in the regional drug trade has changed sharply over the past two decades. Once seen only as a stopover for narcotics moving from South Asia to other markets, it is now a growing destination. This shift has brought new patterns of crime, corruption, and violence.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report on organized criminal networks in the Eastern Indian Ocean region paints a stark picture of this reality. It describes how Sri Lanka’s criminal networks have evolved, how deeply they are connected to foreign actors, and how state institutions have struggled to respond. This article examines those findings and connects them with the ground reality visible in Sri Lanka today.

The Shape of Organized Crime in Sri Lanka

According to the UNODC report, Sri Lanka’s organized criminal networks (OCNs) are unlike the rigid, hierarchical crime groups seen elsewhere. They operate through patron-client relationships, built on personal loyalty rather than clear command lines. These ties often reflect Sri Lanka’s social traditions, where influence flows through family, community, and political patronage.

The report notes that top leaders often run their operations from abroad, especially from the United Arab Emirates, India, and Pakistan. Some even control operations from inside Sri Lankan prisons, using phones and loyal intermediaries. This pattern began after the late 1990s crackdowns, when many criminal leaders fled the country to escape law enforcement.

Courtesy: Associated Press

The networks work in three layers. At the top, leaders abroad or in prison manage the strategy and the global links. The second layer operates inside Sri Lanka, controlling regional networks. The base layer manages street-level trade and territory. This loose but connected structure allows flexibility and security.

The report also points to the demographic profile of members. Most ground-level members are between 20 and 40 years old, while leadership is usually older. Recruitment often targets military deserters and former LTTE members. Their combat skills and discipline make them valuable recruits. It is worth noting that the inclusion of these groups shows how poor reintegration programmes have left ex-combatants vulnerable to criminal recruitment, primarily after the end of the civil war in 2009.

Drug Trafficking as a Business

As the UNODC explains, Sri Lanka’s OCNs have developed sophisticated business models that adapt to local and international pressures. The structure of the drug market depends on geography. In villages, a single operator usually holds monopoly control. In towns, rival groups compete for control, leading to violent clashes.

The report states that Sri Lanka has shifted from a transit hub to a destination market. Initially, the primary function of Sri Lanka was as a temporary staging ground where international drug consignments would be received, concelaed and redistributed to final consumer markets abroad. As such, local involvement was largely limited to logistical support, with the criminal networks in Sri Lanka providing the aforementioned services rather than developing substantial domestic distribution networks. However, the report provides compelling evidence of Sri Lanka's evolution into a destination market through multiple indicators that demonstrate growing domestic consumption patterns. Drug seizure and arrest statistics provide concrete evidence of this transformation. According to 2024 data from the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board, Sri Lanka recorded 228,450 drug-related arrests nationwide, representing a dramatic increase from previous years.

It may be argued that this transformation was fuelled by a combination of economic decline and social vulnerability that created fertile ground for organized crime. The UNODC report highlights how the 2022 economic crisis intensified criminal activity, with grave crimes increasing by 60% during the height of the crisis. Rising poverty and unemployment provided both recruits for trafficking networks and new consumers for illicit substances as social safety nets collapsed. The erosion of legitimate economic opportunities made drug trafficking and distribution comparatively attractive income sources, while widespread social hardship increased demand for substances as a form of escape.

This change has created changes to the consumption patterns, market structure as well as the ensuing violence.

Recent studies conducted by the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board reveal a marked transition in drug consumption preferences, with cannabis initially being the predominant drug consumed, particularly in urban townships, but methamphetamine use increasingly gaining prevalence.

Furthermore, the UNODC report describes drug markets now vary significantly based on geographic and demographic factors, ranging from monopolistic control at the village level to oligopolistic competition in larger townships. This market structure reflects the territorial nature of criminal organizations adapting to serve local consumption rather than simply facilitating international.

One of the most concerning manifestations of Sri Lanka's transformation into a destination market is the dramatic increase in violence associated with territorial competition. The report documents approximately 50 gang-related murders in the first half of 2024, indicating the intensification of territorial disputes and market competition as criminal networks fight for control of lucrative domestic distribution territories.

International coordination is at the core of this trade. Dealers in the UAE and India manage connections with top-level traffickers in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The report describes how drugs are shipped from the Makran coast of Pakistan on dhows, then transferred mid-sea to Sri Lankan vessels. These handovers involve precise timing and coordination, using smaller boats to avoid radar detection.

Method and Technology

The UNODC report highlights how traffickers use fishing trawlers for concealment. Drugs are hidden in ice tanks, radar compartments, hull tanks, gas cylinders, and fake storage units. In some cases, vessels belong to high-level officials or well-connected businessmen, helping shipments bypass inspection. This points to a worrying mix of corruption and organized crime.

Courtesy: Roar Media

Maritime routes remain the main corridor for drug entry. The western coast near Negombo and the southern coastline around Tangalle are the key landing zones. These areas are ideal because traffickers can blend in with regular fishing activity.

The report also notes how traffickers adapted during the COVID-19 pandemic. With maritime controls tightening, they began using air routes and postal systems for smaller shipments. This adaptability shows how quickly these groups adjust to new restrictions.

Their communication systems are equally advanced. They use WhatsApp, Messenger, BOTIM, and Thuraya satellite phones for coordination. Transactions use both cash and online transfers. For international dealings, the Hawala system remains dominant. At the street level, mobile payment apps are now common, showing how digital finance has entered even the local narcotics trade.

The Impact on Security and Governance

The UNODC report explicitly identifies that Sri Lankan “prisons are being misused by the organized criminal group leadership to carry out illegal operations.” This represents a core finding on institutional compromise, revealing that correctional facilities have shifted from spaces of rehabilitation to operational command centers for organized crime networks. The report further emphasizes that “prisons have turned into safe places for the leadership of OCGs to carry out their illegal operations.” This description transforms the traditional understanding of prisons from instruments of state control into sanctuaries where criminal leaders operate with relative impunity. The use of the term “safe places” is particularly telling, implying that these facilities may offer more protection and operational freedom to criminal actors than conditions outside prison walls.

The UNODC documents that many OCN leaders continue to direct their activities from inside prison facilities, often under conditions that starkly contradict the idea of incarceration. The report notes that “inside Sri Lankan prisons, drug dealers have a smart network of courier systems, hand signals, and food concealment systems to transfer drugs inside the prison, as well as communication channels with the outside world through use of smart phones.” These findings reveal multiple layers of institutional failure—suggesting not isolated misconduct, but a sophisticated, systematized network of criminal operations functioning within correctional institutions. The continued use of smartphones by inmates to maintain “steady contact with outside networks” further demonstrates the erosion of basic security measures that should prevent communication and coordination beyond prison walls.

This entrenched criminal control is enabled by deep structural and resource deficiencies within Sri Lanka’s correctional and law enforcement institutions. The UNODC report identifies that these issues persist “due to a lack of sufficient funding for the training of police staff, a paucity of personnel, and the use of outdated equipment and technologies.” It further elaborates that “a lack of awareness, insufficient funding for training of police staff, a paucity of personnel, and outdated equipment makes it difficult for the jail authorities to identify the problems.” These findings indicate systemic rather than incidental weaknesses—where under-resourced, under-trained, and poorly equipped institutions have become vulnerable to manipulation and capture by organized crime groups.

Law enforcement agencies are similarly affected. The report documents several cases in which officers from the Narcotics Bureau were “caught accepting bribes,” while broken evidence chains and tampered custody records have “undermined prosecutions.” These failures allow major traffickers to evade conviction, further eroding public trust in the criminal justice system and reinforcing perceptions of impunity.

One particularly alarming trend highlighted by the report is the convergence between drug and arms trafficking. In 2021, Indian authorities intercepted a Sri Lankan vessel carrying “300 kilograms of heroin and five AK-47 rifles with 1,000 rounds of ammunition.” This case exemplifies how the drug trade now sustains parallel criminal economies, such as the illicit arms market, thereby escalating the threat to both national and regional security.

Ground Reality and Economic Strain

As highlighted above, Sri Lanka’s 2022 economic crisis created the perfect conditions for organized crime to grow. The report links this crisis to a surge in grave crimes, up by 60 percent month-on-month, and a 13 percent increase in drug arrests, reaching 152,979 arrests that year. Poverty and unemploy, ment pushed many young people into the drug economy as both users and sellers.

Courtesy: DailyFT

In 2024, over 3 tons of narcotics worth $76 million were seized nationwide. Authorities made 228,450 drug-related arrests. Heroin and cannabis each accounted for roughly a third, while methamphetamine represented almost 30 percent. These numbers reveal the scale of the crisis and the diversification of the market following the transformation that has taken place as highlighted above.

The prison system remains overwhelmed. Many facilities operate at 300 percent of capacity, allowing OCN leaders to recruit and expand inside. Maritime policing faces similar limits, too few patrols, poor coordination between agencies, and old surveillance technology make it easy for traffickers to slip through.

Implementation Challenges and Policy Feasibility

While the UNODC does not list direct recommendations, its findings point to clear national priorities: stronger regional cooperation, improved maritime enforcement, modernized drug laws, prison reform, and financial investigations targeting criminal assets.

Recent anti-crime initiatives in Sri Lanka, most notably Operation Yukthiya under the previous government and the international arrests in Indonesia under the current National People’s Power (NPP) administration, illustrate both the potential and the limits of policy implementation. Operation Yukthiya, launched in December 2023, achieved impressive quantitative results with over 56,000 arrests and major drug seizures, yet it exposed deep systemic weaknesses. The operation’s heavy reliance on mass arrests, often targeting low-level offenders, revealed the state’s preference for visible enforcement over strategic dismantling of network leadership. UN and Human Rights Commission reports criticized its “security-driven approach,” underscoring how militarized enforcement without institutional reform undermines long-term feasibility.

Operation Yukthiya | Courtesy: Sunday Times

By contrast, the NPP government’s subsequent strategy reflected a significant shift toward targeted, intelligence-led operations and international collaboration. The 2025 arrests of five top Sri Lankan organized crime leaders in Indonesia, conducted with Interpol and Indonesian authorities, demonstrated that politically supported, well-coordinated international operations are feasible and effective. However, these successes also revealed high implementation demands: sustained intelligence capability, diplomatic coordination, and legal tools capable of addressing transnational crime. The government’s use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) to detain suspects highlighted the continuing absence of a specialized legal framework for organized crime.

Despite these advances, long-term feasibility remains constrained by enduring institutional weaknesses, specifically in the prison system as highlighted previously. Political realities further complicate reform feasibility. The report and subsequent events underscore the enduring nexus between politics and organized crime, where local gangs provide electoral or financial support to political actors in exchange for protection. While President Dissanayake’s declaration that “underworld figures no longer have the political patronage they enjoyed before” signals a crucial policy shift, the challenge lies in institutionalizing such commitments to ensure continuity beyond individual leadership cycles.

In sum, Sri Lanka’s anti-organized crime efforts reveal that tactical successes are possible, but strategic, sustainable outcomes depend on institutional reform, political insulation from criminal influence, and consistent international cooperation. Without addressing the structural deficiencies identified by the UNODC policy feasibility will remain limited, and future operations risk repeating the same cycle of short-term visibility and long-term ineffectiveness.

Learning from Maldives

The UNODC report also covers the Maldives, offering useful comparisons. Like Sri Lanka, the Maldives struggles with corruption, prison-based networks, and drug smuggling by sea. But it has made progress by shifting focus from arrests to financial investigations.

Maldivian task forces now track how drug money moves into real estate, guest houses, safaris, and currency exchanges. This has exposed how traffickers launder money through legitimate businesses. Yet, the report notes that these networks quickly adapt—investing in new sectors and forming shell companies.

For Sri Lanka, this experience shows that enforcement alone is not enough. Tackling drug money is essential, but reforms must cover the broader system that enables corruption, from police to politics.

Conclusion

The UNODC report lays bare the depth of organized crime in Sri Lanka. It shows how flexible, foreign-linked, and financially capable these networks have become. They thrive on weak institutions, political interference, and public distrust.

Sri Lanka’s transformation from a transit hub to a destination market marks a new stage in the drug crisis. Local demand has risen, and violence has followed. The challenge is now twofold—cutting international supply routes while confronting domestic networks that have taken deep root.

Some reforms are within reach. Updating laws, expanding cooperation, and improving financial tracking can happen now. But tackling corruption, fixing prisons, and rebuilding trust in justice will take decades of steady effort.

The real test lies in political will. Criminal networks will keep adapting. The question is whether Sri Lanka’s institutions can adapt faster—and stay clean enough to win the fight.

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To read the full UNDOC Report, click here.